Most of the discussions so far have only focused on whether the US has the right to block Appellate Body re-appointments, or if Appellate Body members may be chastised for their statements in Appellate Body reports. This article approaches the debate over the US blockage from a fresh perspective by arguing that the US allegation of obiter dicta is invalid as there is no basis for such claim in the WTO. Through these discussions, the paper provides important insights into the nature of the WTO dispute settlement system, the effects of panel and Appellate Body reports, and their respective functions in WTO dispute settlement.
The Appellate Body Reappointment Saga
On 11 May 2016, the United States ("the US") shocked the world by announcing that they will block the reappointment of Appellate Body member Prof. Seung Wha Chang. In a joint statement issued by Deputy US Trade Representative ("USTR") Michael Punke and USTR General Counsel Tim Reif, the US declared that "The United States is strongly opposed to Appellate Body members deviating from their appropriate role by restricting the rights or expanding the obligations of WTO members under the WTO agreements… The United States will not support any individual with a record of restricting trade agreement rights or expanding trade agreement obligations."
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At the DSB meeting held on May 23, the US further clarified their position by stating that "we do not consider that his service reflects the role assigned to the Appellate Body by WTO Members in the WTO agreements". 12 In particular, the US referred to four reports in which Prof.
Chang allegedly "add[ed] to or diminish[ed] the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements." 13 In three of the four reports, the US accused Prof. Chang of addressing issues which were moot (Argentina -Financial Services), not appealed (India -Agricultural Products),
or not raised by parties (US -Countervailing Measures (China)). 14 According to the US, these amounted to obiter dicta as they are not related to "issues necessary to resolve the dispute". 15 As to the fourth report (US -Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China)), the US claimed that the Appellate Body has adopted "a very problematic and erroneous approach to reviewing a Member's domestic law" by "substitut[ing] the judgment of WTO adjudicators for that of a Member's domestic legal system as to what is lawful under that Member's domestic law". 16 The US blockage led to widespread criticisms from the WTO membership. 17 Prof.
Chang's home country South Korea, in particular, claimed that the US opposition "would seriously undermine the independence and integrity of the Appellate Body" 18 and reportedly declared its opposition to the reappointment of any Appellate Body members. 19 At the DSB meetings where the issue was discussed, the US position received no support from other WTO Members, which called the US blockage "extraordinary, exceptional" 20 and "unprecedented".
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At the dedicated DSB session on the issue on 26 October, Korea, supported by Brazil, India, and
Mexico, tried to solve the problem by tabling a non-paper that proposed to limit future appointments to the Appellate Body to a single term. 22 As not all Members supported the proposal, however, it was not adopted. 23 adopted 16 January 2015; and Appellate Body Report, United States -Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 22 July 2014, DSR 2014:VIII, p. 3027. 14 Ibid., at 13-15. 15 Ibid., at 15. 16 There were also strong reactions from both current and former Appellate Body members.
On May 18, 2016, the six remaining Appellate Body members sent a letter to DSB Chairman Ambassador Xavier Carim. In the letter, they stressed that the Appellate Body reports are reports of the Appellate Body as a whole and "no case is the result of a decision by one Appellate Body
Member, nor should interpretations or outcomes be attributed to a single Member". 24 Moreover, they argued that "the tying of an Appellate Body Member's reappointment to interpretations in specific cases" could undermine the trust of WTO Members "in the independence and impartiality of Appellate Body Members". 25 On May 31, 2016, the 13 living former Appellate Body members also wrote another open letter to Carim, in which they warned that the US action would not only undermine the "impartiality and independence of the … Appellate Body", but "put the very future of the entire WTO trading system at risk". 26 In particular, they pointed out that the US approach is flawed, as "[a] decision on the reappointment of a Member of the Appellate Body should not be made on the basis of the decisions in which that Member has participated as a part of the divisions in particular appeals… Nor should either appointment or reappointment to the Appellate Body be determined on the basis of doctrinal preference".
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They proposed two solutions instead. First, to the extent that "WTO Members ever conclude that the Appellate Body has erred when clarifying a WTO obligation in WTO dispute settlement", they should try to adopt a legal interpretation according to Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement. 28 Second, the Members can also abolish the current system of one four-year term with the possibility of a second four-year term and replace it with "a single, longer term for all Members of the Appellate Body".
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The reappointment saga also generated considerable interest in academic circles, with most scholars condemning the US action and expressing their support to Prof. Chang. 30 Most of the discussions so far revolved around the following issues: whether it is appropriate to attribute the views in an Appellate Body report to one division member only; whether a WTO Member has the right to block the reappointment of an Appellate Body member; should the decision to reappoint an Appellate Body member be influenced by his position on certain WTO law issues or preference for certain judicial style? There are sharply divided views on all of these issues, with the US government saying yes to all, while other WTO Members, former and current Appellate Body members, and the academia mostly saying no.
Curiously, however, one key issue seems to be ignored in the debate. Everyone, no matter where he/she stands in this debate, seems to accept the US accusations that Prof. Chang's views in these decisions amount to obiter dicta, or at least it is possible to have obiter dicta in WTO panel and Appellate Body reports. As I will demonstrate in this article, the entire theory of obiter dictum in WTO dispute settlement reports is flawed as none of its three underlying premises are valid. Thus, in the end, the whole US theory of the possibility of an Appellate Body member violating its role by giving obiter dicta in Appellate Body reports is but a dictum on dicta.
The Concept of Obiter Dictum
To understand the US position, we first need to understand what is "dictum (plural dicta)". Traditionally, a dictum is defined as "an expression of opinion in regard to some point or rule of law, made by a judge in the course of a judicial opinion, but not necessary to the determination of the case before the court." 31 Over the years, alternative definitions have been suggested. These include, for example, "a legal conclusion stated in the opinion but not applicable to the particular facts of the case", or "overgeneralization in light of the particular facts [of the case]". 32 However, neither of these two variations add anything new. If a legal conclusion is divorced from the facts of the case, then it is not necessary to the decision of the case. Similarly, overgeneralizations would also not be necessary for the decision. Thus, both of them can be submerged into the traditional definition.
A. Categories of Dicta
Depending on the manner that the statement in question is pronounced, dictum can be divided into several categories such as obiter dictum, judicial dictum, gratis dictum, dictum proprium, and simplex dictum. 33 Many of the distinctions are now obsolete, and the most widely recognized distinctions are between the first two. 34 The key here is whether the statement in question is fully argued by the parties and deliberated upon by the court. Thus, if a point is neither argued by the parties nor fully deliberated by the court, it is regarded as obiter dictum.
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In contrast, judicial dicta "are the product of a more comprehensive discussion of legal issues, and usually involve points briefed and argued by the parties", 36 but they are "not essential to the decision". 37 As judicial dicta is a more thoughtful opinion than obiter dicta, it is often accorded more persuasive authority, but it is still non-binding. 38 is losing its significance, as many courts in major Common Law jurisdictions such as the US no longer follow the traditional distinction.
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B. The Effects of Dicta
The traditional view is that, unlike the holding or the ratio decidendi of the court, a dictum is not binding. 40 As explained by Black, because dicta "are not the judicial determinations of the court, they are never entitled to the force and effect of precedents, in the same or other courts, and do not preclude the rendering of a subsequent contrary decision". 41 However, this does not mean that a dictum has no effect at all. As observed by Black, dicta "though not precedents, may possess considerable value as persuasive arguments". 42 Thus, lower courts in particular shall treat a dictum "with respectful consideration, not only because it proceeds from the appellate court, but also as furnishing a suggestion of the decision which that court might be expected to make if the point should come fairly before it for determination". 43 In particular, "long repetition of a dictum… may clothe it with the weight of a precedent". 44 This is especially the case for the dicta of the Supreme Court, which has been regarded by lower courts as "very persuasive" and followed "slavishly".
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As we can see from the discussions above, while in theory a dictum is supposed to have no effect upon the development of the jurisprudence, the ultimate fate of a dictum depends upon the treatment, or the "attitudes" of subsequent courts. 46 with the result that "discussion outran the decision". 56 Or worse still, judges may deliberately "plant" dicta to steer the development of the law and "preempt colleagues who might later decide a further issue in a manner not to our liking". 57 These concerns make it necessary to draw the distinction. 49 Ibid., at 163. 50 Ibid., at 164. 51 Ibid., at 164-165. 52 How to draw the distinction then? There are two possible approaches. The first approach is looking at the substantive merits of the respective statements. The most trustworthy statements are those made by the courts when "they are aware of the relevant facts, and the possible competing legal positions have been argued at length by lawyers". 58 In contrast, the courts' "passing comments on peripherally related legal subjects" are much less reliable as they "are expressions of opinions … which may not have been argued at the bar or duly brought to the attention of the court, or that they do not embody the mature and deliberate opinion of the judges". 59 While this approach provides a satisfactory solution to most cases, it would not be able to distinguish judicial dictum from holding as the former also benefits from arguments in court and the full consideration of the court. This is why we need a second approach that also takes into account the raison d'être for the judicial law-making power. The core function of the court is to resolve disputes, thus the law-making power is only a by-product of such function.
Therefore, "the authority of a particular court should extend only to what is needed to resolve the dispute", lest the court, as the "occasional legislators", 60 usurp the legislative function of the "fulltime" legislature, which is the legislative branch proper. 61 This means that the law-making power only extends to those statements necessary to resolve the dispute at hand, but not the unnecessary sound-bites.
Obiter Dictum in WTO Law?
As discussed above, dictum is a concept unique to Common Law. Thus, the argument that the concept also exists in WTO law presumes that the WTO law system is modelled after the Common Law system. Or, short of that, that there is a system of precedents in WTO law. Or alternatively, that the WTO has rules against dictum. However, as I will elaborate below, none of these three assumptions is valid. As I have demonstrated in the last part, the concept of dicta is used to distinguish the unnecessary parts of a decision from the key holding, or the ratio decidendi of the case. Ratio, in turn, forms the main body of precedents, or judge-made law, which is the hallmark of the Common Law system.
A. WTO Follows Common Law
In contrast, neither judicial precedent or judicial law-making is recognized under the Civil Law system. In France, for examples, "[t]he central conviction… is that judges cannot be lawmakers", 62 Instead, "[l]aw-making … was entirely reserved for the legislature. Similarly, in Germany, there has been a long tradition of following Justinian's maxim "non exemplis sed legibus iudicandum est" (decisions should be based on legislations, not on precedents). 69 While there has been increasing reference to court decisions after the Second World War, 70 there is still "no more inclination than before to urge a strict theory of precedent on
German courts". 71 Indeed, attempts to make the decisions of the Constitutional Court binding were explicitly rejected by the Great Senate for Civil Matters, which noted that making the decisions of the court binding on all organs of the government "would be to elevate a court into a supreme law-making body not chosen by the people, to eliminate the safeguarding formalities essential to law-making in a Rechtstaat, to destroy the separation of governmental powers and the federal system, and to borrow from the Anglo-Saxon legal world conceptions of judicial power that are alien to Germany."
72 As I will demonstrate in the next two sub-sections, the WTO rules do not recognize either a binding precedent system or judicial law-making power. This clearly rules out the possibility that the WTO is based on the Common Law model. 73 Instead, if one has to choose one between the two systems, the Civil Law system has a much stronger claim for influencing the WTO legal system. There are three reasons for this: 69 First, the main source of law in Common Law is judicial decisions or judge-made law, while legislations reign supreme in Civil Law countries. 74 Similarly, the paramount role of formal legislations in the WTO has been repeated ad nauseam. In the WTO parlance, these legislations are known as "covered agreements", i.e., agreements listed in Appendix 1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"). 75 In the DSU, the phrase "covered agreement", in either singular or plural forms, appeared 72 times in the main text and 7 times in the Appendixes and footnotes. The key provision is Art. 3.2, which emphasizes that the purpose of the dispute settlement system is "to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements". It also warns that the DSB "cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements" in its recommendations and rulings, which is repeated verbatim in Art. 19.1. Similarly, according to Arts. 7.1 and 11, the function of the panel is confined to examine the consistency of the challenged trade measure with the relevant provisions in the "covered agreements". Such slavish reliance on legislations can only be found in the Civil Law system.
Second, as the legislature monopolizes the law-making power in Civil Law countries, the role of the judiciary is reduced to that of a technical 76 or even grammatical 77 interpreter within rigid parameters. 78 This approach is grounded in the idea that the Codes provide a complete and perfect set of legal text that can encompass "all cases that life could possibly offer" 79 and judges are "merely applying pre-existing rules -the rules laid down in the code". 80 Again, such an approach is adopted by the WTO legal system, which does not recognize any source of law other than the sacred "covered agreements". The role of a WTO panel, according to Art. 11.1 of the DSU, is to make "an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements". The wordings suggest that all that a WTO panel need to do is to mechanically apply the covered agreements and then determine the 74 
B. WTO Follows Stare decisis
As I have demonstrated above, the view that the WTO follows the Common Law model is a fallacy. However, is it possible that the WTO, while not adopting the Common Law system on a wholesale basis, still follows the rule of stare decisis or binding precedents? Again, the answer has to be no.
At the outset, we should recall, as John Jackson has pointed out, "the international legal system does not embrace the common law jurisprudence … which calls for courts to operate under a stricter 'precedent' or 'stare decisis' rule". 104 108 In my view, however, this is far from acceptance of the doctrine of stare decisis, as it merely uses the permissive language "may", which still falls far short of granting binding force to precedents.
Similarly, the concept of precedent is also far from uncontroversial in the multilateral trading system. During the GATT era, the Contracting Parties took differing views on the issue.
The European Economic Community ("EEC"), for example, argued that Panel findings shall be "limited to the specific measures under examination" and should not have precedential effect. 109 The US, on the other hand, argued that "when the Council adopted a report, those interpretations became GATT law". 110 between the same parties, the Appellate Body also made clear that such reasoning shall be relied on by not only "the Panel in this case", but also all "future panels".
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Some "future panels", however, chose to ignore the Appellate Body's edict, resulting in a tug of war between the panel and the Appellate Body. The most contentious battle is fought over the legality of "zeroing" practices by the US, where some WTO panels persistently refused to follow settled Appellate Body jurisprudence on the issue. In the US -Stainless Steel (Mexico)
case, for example, the Panel refused to follow previous Appellate Body decisions even though it was aware that its reasoning is very similar to those of the two Panel decisions that have been overruled by the Appellate Body. 127 According to the Panel, such an approach is mandated by
Article 11 of the DSU, which requires panels to carry out an objective examination of the matter at issue. 128 The EU, one of the third parties in the case, became so frustrated that it asked the Appellate Body "to unambiguously re-confirm that all panels are expected and therefore also obliged, to follow its rulings on these issues" (emphasis original). 129 Their frustration is shared by the Appellate Body, which stated that they "are deeply concerned about the Panel's decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues". 130 Citing the need to ensure "security and predictability" in the dispute settlement system in Article 3.2 of the DSU, the Appellate Body held that "[w]hile the application of a provision may be regarded as confined to the context in which it takes place, the relevance of clarification contained in adopted Appellate Body reports is not limited to the application of a particular provision in a specific case." 131 Thus, the Appellate Body concluded, "absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case." Therefore, at most, one can only claim the existence of a de facto precedent system in the WTO, but "it is certainly not stare decisis", To paraphrase Jackson, much of the confusion regarding the precedential effect of the panel and Appellate Body reports arose because the word "precedent" is a "complex concept"
with "many flavors". 138 To avoid this, Jackson proposed to view the word as "a multi-layered concept, or at least as having a number of different approaches of different flavors". However, as
we can see from the foregoing discussion, such an approach could still lead to confusions.
Instead, I would suggest ceasing to refer to the previous decisions of the Appellate Body as precedents, but to call them as "jurisprudence" instead.
Moreover, as Beshkar and Chilton have argued, conferring binding force on Appellate
Body reports could raise substantive systematic costs. 139 For example, WTO Members might rush to bring cases, or at least participate as third parties, in a bid to shape the jurisprudence through litigation. 140 Wrong judicial precedents might perpetuate over time as the consensus requirement makes it difficult for the legislative branch to correct them. 141 All these will be unfair for the small and poorer countries as they are less likely to participate in WTO disputes.
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In addition to these practical reasons, I would add another very important constitutional reason. The Appellate Body was set up as a "safety valve" 143 to check against "rogue" panels 144 which might render "bad reports". 145 It was never meant to be a judicial branch that is on par with the legislative branch to safeguard the so-called separation of powers as under some domestic legal systems. Elevating Appellate Body reports to the status of binding precedents could seriously undermine the nature of the WTO as a "Member-driven" organization.
C. WTO Has Rules Against Dicta
Even if the WTO does not have a system of precedent, could it still have rules against dicta? This is more than pure academic speculation, as many WTO Members, especially the US, has repeatedly referred to certain parts of panel reports as "dicta" in their written submissions.
This point, however, is highly contestable as what a WTO Member might view as "obiter dictum" may often be a necessary link in the panel's overall analysis leading to the final findings. The very first case where the Appellate Body mentioned dicta is the CanadaPeriodicals case, in which the Appellate Body held that, the statement by the panel in EECOilseeds 148 that "it can reasonably be assumed that a payment not made directly to producers is not made 'exclusively' to them" is "obiter dicta" because the panel already found that subsidies paid to oilseeds processors were not made "exclusively to domestic producers". 149 However, the Appellate Body does not explain further why such statement is considered dicta. We can only surmise that the statement is regarded as dicta because it is about a moot issue.
In the US -Shrimp (Article 21. To sum up, as the discussions above have illustrated, the covered agreements do not really distinguish between holdings or dicta in a decision. Thus, if anything, the Appellate Body's announcement on so-called "dicta" in panel and Appellate Body reports is nothing but dictum on dicta. This approach is dangerous not only because it lacks legal basis in the covered agreements, but also because it could backfire when Members in turn borrow the term and accuse the Appellate Body itself of rolling out dicta, which is exactly what the US has done in the reappointment saga.
Conclusion
As Hersch Lauterpacht has wisely warned 60 years ago, "[i]t is not conducive to clarity to apply to the work of the Court the supposedly rigid delimitation between obiter dicta and ratio decidendi applicable to a legal system based on the strict doctrine of precedent." 157 The reason for this, as explained by former International Court of Justice President Jennings, is that when international lawyers talk about an obiter dictum, they imply "the existence in international law decisions of something that the common lawyer calls the ratio decidendi." 158 Similarly, "whenever judges or publicists talk about obiter dicta the point of the distinction from the ratio decidendi is conceded by implication."
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However, as I have argued in this article, the Appellate Body has consistently rejected the idea that there is a system of binding precedents or stare decisis in the WTO. To be consistent, the Appellate Body should then stop using such loaded words like ratio and dicta, both of which are unique to the Common Law system of binding precedents. If the Appellate Body agrees with the previous rulings of the panel or itself, they shall just refer to it as "persuasive jurisprudence", or "jurisprudence constante" if they prefer to use a more established term. If they do not like the ruling on a particular issue, the Appellate Body should just state that it is wrong, or that it is not relevant to the issues raised in the case, not necessary for the resolution of the dispute at hand, or concerns a moot issue that is not argued by the parties, rather than bury it under the ambiguous and unhelpful tombstone of "obiter dicta". This is not just a petty issue of mere semantics, because words could influence people's As the reasoning is not adopted, there is no need to debate whether it falls under ratio or dicta.
However, amendment of the DSU might be needed as one could argue that, under Arts. 16.4 and 17.14, the entire panel or Appellate Body report shall be adopted.
Second, if the Appellate Body's interpretation on a particular provision is so universally endorsed by the Members that the Members really want it to become part of WTO law, it shall be adopted only with a three-fourths majority of the Members. This is how an authoritative interpretation by the General Council or Ministerial Conference may be adopted, and it should also be how the interpretations of the Appellate Body are accorded authoritative status. It would create perverse incentives if such interpretation could be sneaked in through back-door via the operation of the negative consensus rule for the adoption of Appellate Body reports while a proper authoritative interpretation has to go through the painful process of garnering the requisite majority among all WTO Members.
Third, on the other hand, if the Members are so appalled by what they perceive to be a blatantly wrongful interpretation by the Appellate Body in its report, they could always prevent further contamination of the WTO jurisprudence by trying to adopt an authoritative interpretation of the relevant provision and explicitly reject the approach taken by the AB, just like a parliament would do in a Common Law jurisdiction. Of course, as at least one disputing party always stands to benefit from the interpretation at issue, it might be difficult to reach the consensus required to adopt the authoritative interpretation, unless such benefiting Member is also willing to join the consensus for systemic reasons.
In view of the current paralysis of the decision-making mechanism of the WTO, it might take some time before such suggestions may be accepted in practice. In the meantime, the Appellate Body should at least rid its reports off words such as "dicta", lest the self-fulfilling prophecy ultimately becomes the Appellate Body's own destiny.
